One of the unique aspects of China’s miraculous growth over the past decade has been the large share of investment and conversely, the low share of consumption. Consumption accounts for about 37% of GDP in China, compared with about 70% in the United States and 55-57% in Japan, India, Germany, and South Korea. Meanwhile, gross fixed capital formation has consistently been above 30% of Chinese GDP, and has recently surged to almost 50%. Most of the commentary on Chinese growth has focused on “global imbalances” and the need for the Chinese to consume more and export less. While this is certainly an important topic, today I want to discuss another important issue: overinvestment and overcapacity.
There is nothing wrong in principle with investment constituting a large share of GDP; in order to “catch-up” to developed nations, many emerging economies have gone through investment booms. However, the length and magnitude of China’s boom creates cause for concern. Consider the charts below from Pivot Capital Management (HT: Money Supply Blog):


The trouble with such an enormous investment boom is revealed in chart 4: diminishing efficiency of investments. The Incremental Capital Output Ratio (Incremental Capital Output Ratio is the ratio of Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP divided by real GDP growth) measures how much investment is needed to produce GDP growth – the higher the ratio, the more inefficient the investment. As you can see, the efficiency of Chinese investment has deteriorated in the past decade and was particularly wasteful in 2009.
But why is all this inefficient investment being undertaken? If the return on such investment is so low, how does it continue to attract the necessary capital? The answer is China’s command-and-control economy – although China has somewhat liberalized its economy, the government remains heavily involved in crucial economic decisions.
As a communist country, China faces the risk of political unrest among its population. In order to ensure the government remains in power, it is therefore necessary to generate enough growth to provide employment for the growing labor force. Estimates peg 8% GDP growth as the magic number that must be maintained (this is also the growth target the government has set for 2010). In order to meet this target, the national and local governments have actively pursued policies aimed at stimulating investment:
1) Maintaining an undervalued yuan, which increases profitability of export-related investments
2) Issuing a large volume of loans through state-owned banks
3) Creating artificially low interest rates by capping deposit rates and implicitly and explicitly guaranteeing loans
4) Aid from local governments due to regional protectionism
5) Low input prices due to government subsidies
Furthermore, the fiscal stimulus package enacted in response to the global financial crisis emphasizes investment as the engine of growth. With domestic consumption and foreign demand weak, investment is the only way the government can ensure strong growth in 2009 and possibly 2010.
Now let’s turn to the consequences of the investment boom: overcapacity. A report released in late November by the European Chamber exposes the problem:

Because of the sluggish nature of the global recovery, demand for Chinese products is expected to recover only gradually. In spite of this, and the enormous spare capacity already evident, investment in these sectors continues! This is not only an issue for China but for the global economy – as the charts below show, China’s production and excess capacity in these sectors is huge relative to overall global production. China is the world’s largest producer of steel, producing more than the US, EU, Russia, and Japan combined. Meanwhile, China’s excess cement capacity is greater than the consumption of the US, Japan and India combined. The scope of the problem is immense: there is enough capacity in China to handle a recovery in foreign demand, but there is already more capacity in the pipeline!

While incoming capacity may serve Beijing’s goals of growing employment, the profitability of such ventures must be questioned. At such low utilization rates, how can we expect these factories and businesses to pay back their loans? European Chamber:
The extremely low utilisation rates in industries producing at overcapacity go hand-in-glove with resource waste. Companies are cutting corners, often disregarding environmental as well as health and safety standards and circumventing labour and social laws. Companies in overcapacity industries suffer from low profits and lack sufficient cash for R&D projects, leading to less innovation. Meanwhile, as banks bankroll the addition of unnecessary capacity in certain industries, the threat from non-performing loans (NPLs) is growing.
The threat from NPLs is serious and understated. Although the Chinese government has a small amount of explicit debt (23% of GDP), the implicit debt is much higher. Pivot:
Not included in the public debt figures are the liabilities of the local governments, which the Ministry of Finance estimated at $680bn as of the end of 2008. In addition to that, a large part of the loans extended this year (estimated at $350bn) went to finance public infrastructure projects guaranteed by local governments. Furthermore, when the Chinese government bailed out its banking system in 2003, it set up Asset Management Companies that issued bonds to the banks at par for the non-performing loans that were transferred to them. These bonds, worth about $260bn, are explicitly guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank and sit on the balance sheets of the big four banks. The Chinese government also explicitly guarantees $400bn worth of debt of the three “policy banks”. In total, these off-balance sheet liabilities are equal to $1.7tn, which would bring China’s public debt to GDP ratio up to 62%, a level that is comparable to the Western European average.
Bringing it all together: In order to prevent political unrest under a communist government, China must meet certain growth targets to maintain employment. To accomplish this, both the national and local governments have provided a wide variety of subsidies to promote investment growth. These subsidies include but are not limited to: an undervalued yuan, stimulus funds, weak lending standards, strong loan growth, and implicit and explicit loan guarantees. These subsidies have over-stimulated investment, leading to projects that are wasteful and in many cases, most likely not profitable. This creates a significant downside risk in the form of non-performing loans. Should these investments not realize the rate-of-return required to pay back their loans, we may see a surge in non-performing loans. Moreover, the government of China, with large amounts of implicit debt, is in a much more fragile position than investors assume.
The reports by Pivot Capital Management and the European Chamber can be found on my Documents page.